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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation:

Maritime Safety Supervision and Navigation Service
of Offshore Wind Farms in China

Degree:

MSc

Offshore wind power is clean energy that has drawn tremendous attention and grown
rapidly over the past decade in China. In comparison with other energies, offshore
wind power has several advantages, inter alia, no occupancy of land space,
abundance in wind resource and suitability of large-scale development. However, the
development of offshore wind farms (OWFs) unavoidably have profound impacts on
navigation environment. A majority of OWFs have been established in the offshore
sea areas, while inappropriate siting, insufficient distances to shipping routes,
inadequate safety mitigation measures and unsuitable marking of wind turbines are
undoubtedly detrimental to safety of navigation.
In the first chapter, this dissertation introduces the state of the art on the risk
management of OWFs both at home and abroad from different perspectives, and
identifies three unsettled issues that are clarified subsequently. In the second chapter,
the impacts of OWFs on the navigation environment are illustrated from the design,
construction, operating and decommissioning phase of offshore wind farm, and three
salient risk factors are identified and analysed thereafter. In chapter three, taking the
Binhai Offshore Wind Farm as an example, a quantitative navigational risk
assessment is conducted. In chapter four, based on the achievements of the
navigational risk assessment and the analyses, risk control options have been
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proposed from the perspectives of maritime safety supervision and navigation service
to enhance safety of navigation around OWFs. Finally, the author wraps up the
dissertation by summarizing essential risk factors and risk mitigation measures, and
puts forward the practical solutions that involves cooperation of both the maritime
authorities and OWFs developers in order to promote a harmonious coexistence
between shipping industry and offshore energy industry in the use of marine spaces.

KEY WORDS:

Offshore Wind Farm; Maritime Safety Supervision;

Navigation Service; Risk assessment; AIS; Risk Control Options.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Background
Currently, the GHG emission generated by human activities are still rising each year.
The 13th Sustainable Development Goal for addressing climate change called for
affordable and effective solutions from all countries to ensure the health and
resilience of national economies. China has been taking strong measures to address
climate change and is committed to peaking the CO2 emission as soon as possible by
2030 and accomplishing carbon neutral by 2060. Due to the impact of GHG emission
restrictions and implementation of environmental protection policies, the demand for
renewable energy has been increasing dramatically. Wind energy compared with the
conventional coal-fired power generation is a renewable and clean energy source
with zero CO2 emission. The use of onshore wind energy had been close to saturation
along with its continuous development, which gave rise to offshore wind energy.
With a series of advantages of abundance in resources, high power generation
efficiency, no occupation of land, small impact on the ecological environment, no
consumption of non-renewable energy sources and suitability for large-scale
construction, the offshore wind energy generation has been attracting lots of
attentions (ZHANG, 2014). Since the construction of the first commercial offshore
wind farm (OWF) in Denmark in 1991, offshore wind power has grown rapidly in
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Europe (CHEN, 2020). And China commenced developing its first commercial OWF
in 2010, lagging behind for almost twenty years in the offshore wind energy
exploitation has not held China back. According to the statistics from WFO1, China’s
offshore wind sector continued to grow rapidly with a total capacity of 4.4 GW under
construction in 2020. Despite the supply chain disruption due to the outbreak of
COVID-19, the global offshore wind industry continued to grow strongly with more
than 5.2 GW of added offshore wind capacity in 2020, as illustrated in Figure 1.1
(World Forum Offshore Wind, 2021).

Figure 1.1

Global offshore wind growth despite COVID-19

From “Global offshore wind report-2020”, by WFO, 2021, p.3. https://www.wfo-global.org

However, the rapid development of offshore wind industry has also posed profound
influences to the maritime industry (HE, 2016). In the operating phase, the OWF
brings the impacts of fragmentation and tridimensional exclusivity to the use of the
sea area, leading to the loss of compatibility of the sea resources, and permanently
affects the safety of navigation. The presence of OWF will complicate the navigation
environment of the adjacent waters. For examples, inadequate distance to shipping
routes, waterways and anchorages may present a risk of collision between ship and
World Forum Offshore Wind (WFO) is the world’s first organization 100% dedicated to fostering the global
growth of offshore wind energy.
1
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wind turbine, unsuitable establishment and maintenance of Aids to Navigation
(AtoNs) may confuse the navigators and induce improper handling of ships, and the
electromagnetic radiation generated during the operating phase of OWF may affect
the navigational equipment on board ships (LIANG, 2018).

1.2 Research purpose and significance
From the point of view of maritime safety concerns, based on the previous researches
and achievements, this dissertation aims to carry out a comprehensive study on the
impacts of OWF on safety of navigation of ships, and then proposes risk mitigation
measures as references for the maritime authorities in China to enhance safety of
navigation and protection of marine environment.

1.3 Literature review
1.3.1 Research status on risk management of OWF
Regarding to the impact of OWF on safety of navigation of ships, REN et al. (2010),
discussed the potential risks of the commercial vessels and infield support vessels
affected by wind and current, and the drifting patterns of vessels not under command
due to wind and current. The authors laid down ship’s safe navigation and preventive
measures according to the characteristics of the offshore wind farm. GU, E.K. (2015)
discussed the impact of OWF in each phase on the navigation environment and put
forward technical countermeasures in the development process of OWF from the
perspective of maritime supervision. YU et al. (2018) proposed a framework to
characterize the influence of an OWF on maritime traffic and on a specific route by
means of a statistical analysis of AIS data, which provided a data-based approach for
future works on OWF siting, collision/allision risk analysis and management. LIU et
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al. (2010) studied the the influence of OWFs on the radar, showing that the shaded
area had little impact on radar at a distance more than 200 metres to wind turbine, but
it was difficult for radar to detect the objects inside and in close vicinity of OWF, and
the authors concluded that OWFs posed certain threat to safe navigation of ships.
ZHANG, M. (2014) studied the impacts of OWF on vessels, AtoNs, VHF, Radar,
magnetic compass, GPS, AIS and other maritime communication signals, eventually
raised safety measures during the OWF operating phase.
Regarding to the risk assessment of OWF during construction and operating phases.
LI et al. (2013), established risk assessment criteria and risk assessment model
during operating phase using fuzzy network analysis and support vector machine,
providing reliable basis for risk management of OWF during operating phase. XIE,
Z.Z. (2013), put forward OWF risk assessment criteria system including natural
hazards, accidents, breakdown of facilities, management risks and market risks.
And she proposed the OWF risk assessment model using support vector machine,
which provided a calculable tool better than conventional methods in terms of
convenience and accuracy for OWF risk management. Similarly, JIANG et al. (2014),
proposed the OWF risk assessment criteria system, including natural conditions,
traffic conditions, AtoNs, turbine conditions, VTS, emergency response, etc., and
then the authors conducted comprehensive assessment using fuzzy comprehensive
evaluation method. Moulas et al. (2017), developed a nonlinear finite element
analysis (NLFEA) approach to identify various collision scenarios and evaluate the
damage to offshore wind foundations stricken by infield vessels. The results of this
research provided an insight on how the next generation of wind turbine foundations
can be designed in a more “collision-friendly” way. Torres et al. (2020) presented the
concept of a methodology for the indicator-based assessment of the safety of OWFs,
which employed key performance indicators as well as key risk indicators. These
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indicators enabled not only the online monitoring of the infrastructure, but also the
exploration of its response to hazardous events–a fundamental requirement for
resilience assessment.
Regarding to OWF siting. LI et al. (2014), based on the traffic characteristics of the
Fujian planned OWFs sea area, the authors identified primary maritime risk factors
around OWFs sea area, and then carried out qualitative and quantitative analyses
using expert inquiry, preliminary hazard analysis and fuzzy comprehensive
evaluation methods. The degree of navigation safety impacts of the eighteen planned
OWFs were sorted out from highest to lowest, providing reference for the
construction of OWFs. JIANG (2012), analysed the navigation safety of a planned
OWF with a mathematical model established by combining fuzzy mathematics and
analytic hierarchy process, which could be used for site optimization of OWF. CHEN
et al. (2017), from the perspective of navigation safety, analysed the factors affecting
the safety of navigation around OWF, built a model utilizing analytical hierarchy
process, entropy evaluation method and grey correlation analysis method, which was
used to select the site with minimum impacts on the safety of navigation. The
informed decision of OWF siting can be made through the application of this model.
Kim et al. (2016), put forward four categories of siting criteria, including energy
resources and economics, conservation areas and landscape protection, human
activities, and the marine environment and marine ecology. The authors conducted a
study on feasible evaluation of OWF siting around Jeju island utilizing marine spatial
techniques from GIS.
Regarding to the minimum safety distance between OWF and waterway, customary
route, recommended route, anchorage, obstructions, etc. Many scholars had
developed different models to recommend minimum safety distance. NIE et al.
(2019), based on Monte Carlo simulation, developed the ship-OWF collision
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probability model considering the influence of ship type, position, speed, wind and
current. Then, the authors analysed the correlation between collision probability and
distance between OWF and waterway, and obtained the acceptable safety distance
ranging from 1,300 to 3,000 metres. WANG et al. (2020), considering characteristics
of ships, safety area required for normal operation of wind turbine, wind-induced
drift and current-induced drift, etc., developed the calculation model of the safety
distance between OWF and waterway based on the improved drift model of ships not
under command, eventually worked out the minimum safety distance of 2,800 metres
without collision accident incurred by ships not under command. The UK Maritime
and Coastguard Agency (MCA, 2016) recommended a minimum safety distance of
no less than 0.5 nautical miles between OWF boundary and waterway. Rawson et al.
(2015), suggested that the distance should be longer than 1,000 metres to reduce
collision risks (as cited by YU et al. 2019). In order to ensure the navigation safety of
ships in waterways, a safety distance of at least 3 miles to OWFs was defined by
Spyridonidou & Vagiona (2020).
Regarding to the navigation service2. JIANG & LI. (2019) studied on the AtoNs
placement scheme for OWF during construction and operating phases to facilitate
safe navigation of ships. Basically, “Maritime Buoyage System, China, GB
4696-2016” and IALA related recommendations were referred. During the
construction phase of an OWF, special marks (mainly light buoys) were established
with Morse “O” light characteristic. During operating phase, light beacons were
established on Significant Peripheral Structures and Intermediate Peripheral
Structures with Morse “C” light characteristic. CHEN.J.J. (2017), taking Gui Shan
OWF for instance, analysed the standardability and reasonability of OWF AtoNs

Navigation service under China’s maritime regulatory regime consists four areas of business: Aids to
Navigation, Maritime communication, Maritime surveying and Mapping. This thesis mainly focuses on Aids to
Navigation service.
2

6

placement during operating phase. “Maritime Buoyage System, China, GB
4696-2016”, “The Regulation for Marking of Offshore structures in China,
GB17380-1998” and IALA Recommendation R0139 “The Marking of Man-Made
Offshore Structures” were applied. The Significant Peripheral Structures and the
Intermediate Peripheral Structures were fitted with special marks, yet differently for
conspicuity and distinction. Morse “C” Yellow 12 s for the former, Morse “U” White
15 s for the latter.
1.3.2 Summary of the research status
Plenty of researches on OWFs risk assessments had been conducted, providing good
references for risk management of OWFs during design, construction and operating
phases. But those researches are for the benefit of OWF enterprises and ship users.
It’s undeniable that more attention should be brought to the enhanced maritime safety
supervision and navigation service to ensure safety of navigation in the vicinity of
OWFs. Based on the literature review at home and abroad, navigational risk
assessment (NRA) has been applied in different levels and aspects, including OWF
siting, minimum safety distance analysis. However, there are still some technical
problems needing further researches.
First, it’s widely recognized that the navigational risk assessment should be duly
carried out during the design, construction and operating phase of an OWF, providing
valuable information for decision makers on matters of OWF siting and minimum
safety distance, etc. Although many authors have presented risk assessment models
from different perspectives, it seems that the use of assessment models are
multifarious. The government and construction parties using different risk
assessment models could obtain quite different results.
Second, “The Marking of Offshore Structures in Chinese Sea Areas, GB17380-1998”

7

was formulated more than twenty years ago, most of the marking techniques were
out of date which made this regulation inapplicable to current offshore activities.
Generally speaking, regarding the marking of OWFs, two contradictory approaches
were applied. Most of OWFs were marked according to IALA Recommendation
R0139, but quite a few OWFs were still marked according to GB17380-1998. The
problem of different marking techniques is that Mariners perhaps would get confused
and have difficulty in identifying the navigational marks and result in misoperation.
Third, based on the literature review, very little attention were given to the
decommissioning of OWFs both at home and abroad. From the point of view of
maritime safety, the decommissioning of an OWF should be treated as a reverse
process of installation, only it’s a removal of marine structures. And it’s possible that
some wind turbines may be dismantled wholly or partially, leaving the foundation
untreated or even abandoned in extreme cases, in this regard the marine structures
will become obstructions for safety of navigation.

1.4 The main research contents and key problems to be solved
· The current research status of maritime safety supervision and navigation service
on OWFs at home and abroad.
·

Introduce the OWF’s impacts on navigation environment, analyse particular risk

factors that severely affect safety of navigation.
· Assess and analyse the impact of one specific OWF to the safety of navigation of
ships during the operating phase.
· Propose a series of risk control options based on the risk assessment and research
from the regulatory and service perspective respectively corresponding to the design,
construction, operating and decommissioning phases of OWF.

8

1.5 Research programme
·

Literature reading and analysis. Through extensive reading of relevant papers,

journals, books, reports and other materials, a comprehensive knowledge about
navigational risk assessment methods, the impacts of OWF on safe navigation of
ships and current risk mitigation measures will be gained, laying foundation for
further research of this dissertation.
·

Expert consultation and questionnaire research. Invite experts from maritime

authorities, navigation safety agencies, port authorities, OWF development and
construction parties, pilots and mariners to carry out expert consultation. Send
questionnaires to AtoNs departments to acquire the general status on the marking of
OWFs in China.
·

Risk assessment theoretical research and application. Carry out a study on

different navigational risk assessment methods used by different countries and
organizations, and then choose an appropriate model and a specific OWF site with
available data to conduct risk assessment.

1.6 Main points of innovation
A novel navigational risk assessment model has been developed. It is an AIS
data-based quantitative method that can be used to calculate the distance of closest
approach and average distance of approach of ships navigating in a waterway to the
obstructions such as wind turbines, isolated hazards, etc. Eventually, risk of
navigation can be analysed and assessed.
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Chapter 2

Risk Analysis of OWFs

2.1 Overview of offshore wind farm
2.1.1 The introduction of OWF
OWF is a way of generating electricity through large-scale construction of wind
power plants in the sea that captures wind energy and transforms them into electric
energy. According to the characteristics of the sea areas, OWFs can be generally
categorized into intertidal zone and subtidal zone wind farm, nearshore wind farm
and deep-sea wind farm. The intertidal zone and subtidal zone wind farm are usually
situated in sea areas with depth of water less than 5 metres in theoretically lowest
tide level. The nearshore wind farm is usually situated in sea areas with depth of
water between 5-50 metres in theoretically lowest tide level. And the deep-sea wind
farm is usually situated in sea areas with depth of water more than 50 metres in
theoretically lowest tide level. Currently, most of OWFs in China have been installed
offshore in intertidal zone and subtidal zone. An OWF usually consists of wind
turbines, meteorological mast, substation, submarine cables and centralized control
center. There are different kinds of foundations including monopile, tripod, jacket
and floating foundations, among which monopile undoubtedly is the most popular
choice of foundation for offshore turbines (Wright et al., 2016). Different foundations
applicable to various water depths and bottoms have diversified impacts on
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navigation environment.
2.1.2 The development of OWFs in China
China is rich in wind energy in many coastal provinces such as Liao Ning, Shan
Dong, Jiang Su, Zhe Jiang, Fu Jian, Guang Dong and Hai Nan, providing favorable
premise for developing OWFs. Statistics show that the exploitable reserves of wind
resources in China’s coastal areas are approximately 750 million KW (YI, 2004). The
electricity supply shortage of eastern coastal areas could be effectively relieved if the
kinetic energy of the wind were to be exploited adequately. “The Renewable Energy
Law of China” came into force on January 1, 2006. In September 2007, the National
Development and Reform Commission proposed the “Medium-and Long-term
Program for Renewable Energy Development”. In 2010, the National Energy
Administration, together with the National Oceanic Administration, issued the
“Interim Measures for the Management of Offshore Wind Power Development and
Construction”. These early regulations have offered both guidance and stimulation
for the development of OWFs. China started its first experimental prototype in Bohai
Bay in 2007, and then completed the construction of its first OWF in July 2010 (LIU,
2020). Since then, China has been putting tremendous efforts in developing OWFs.
By the end of 2020, China’s cumulative installed capacity of offshore wind power
had broken through 9 GW, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. According to Global Offshore
Wind Report 2020, global offshore wind capacity in operation surpassed 32 GW, in
particular, China poised to overtake Germany as the world’s second largest offshore
wind market. As shown in Table 2.1, nearly 10 GW of offshore wind capacity was
under construction worldwide by the end of 2020, among which 51.8% was being
installed in China3 (WFO, 2021).
On January 3, 2020, Ministry of Finance, China announced the abolition of state subsidies for offshore wind
power after 2021, which led to surge in construction of OWFs as we have seen through the statistics.
3
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Figure 2.1

OWFs installed in China between 2014 and 2020

Adapted from “In-depth report of China’s offshore wind industry-2020”, by Bei Ji Xing Wind Power
Grid, 2021, p.26. https://news.bjx.com.cn/html/20210322/1143271.shtml

Table 2.1
NO.

Global OWFs under construction worldwide
Wind Farm

MW

Location

1

Borssele 5

19

NL

2

Kincardine – Phase 2 (floating)

48

UK

3

Southwest Offshore Demonstration Phase 1

60

KR

4

Changhua Phase 1

109

CH

5

Fujian Fuqing Haitan Strait

154

CH

6

Longyuan Putian Nanri Island Phase 1

200

CH

7

Fujian Putian City Flat Bay (Zone F)

200

CH

8

Pingtan Changjiangao

204

CH

9

Daishan 4

234

CH

10

Fuqing Xinghuawan Offshore Wind Phase II

280

CH

11

Datang Jiangsu Binhai

300

CH

12

Zhuhai Jinwan

300

CH

13

Tangshan Area 6 Phase 2

300

CH

14

Sheyang H1

300

CH

15

CTGNE Yangjiang Shapa Phase 1

300

CH

16

Yangjiang Nanpengdao

300

CH

17

Windpark Fryslan

383

NL

18

Jieyang Shenquan

400

CH

19

Three Gorges Renewables YangXi II

400

CH

20

Neart na Gaoithe

450

UK

21

Shanwei Houhu Offshore Wind Phase I

500

CH

12

22

Kriegers Flak

605

DK

23

Yunlin

640

CH

24

Triton Knoll

857

UK

25

Moray East

950

UK

26

Hornsea 2

1400

UK

Total

9893

Source: Adapted from “Global offshore wind report-2020”, by WFO, 2021, p.8.
https://www.wfo-global.org

2.1.3 The impacts of OWFs on navigation environment
OWFs have specific issues where they are in conflict with traditional activities such
as navigation of ships. Particular aspects of OWFs that need to be considered include:
OWFs are situated in open water, where seafarers don’t expect to encounter obstacles;
OWFs have both fixed parts and moveable parts, and have parts both under and
above the water surface; OWFs are individual constructions, formed into an array;
OWFs are interconnected with electrical and data transmission marine cables; OWFs
are strategic energy infrastructure, making them sensitive to damage; and OWFs
generate invisible perturbations in the form of electromagnetic radiation.
Generally, the entire life circle of an OWF can be categorized into four phases, which
includes the design phase, construction phase, operating phase and decommissioning
phase. Each phase involves various types of waterborne activities that last for long
period of time. This will inevitably affect navigation environment and create major
conflicts with safety of navigation. The OWF’s influences on navigation environment
are complex and varied. Problems emerging from each phase may lead to incidents.
Hence as the first thing to do it’s essential to get an idea of those impacts on
navigation environment.
(i)

In the design phase. This phase involves certain waterborne activities such as

hydrographic survey, geological prospecting and wind resources survey that require
ship operations, which will increase the traffic density of the operation sea area and
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affect the safety of navigation of ship in the vicinity. The engineering practice shows
that OWF has the attribute of exclusiveness, which breaks the compatibility with
other maritime activities. Only considering the self-development needs and wind
resources will result in improper planning of OWF siting that will lead to conflicts
with customary route, anchorage and military exercise area, etc. To make things
worse, the planned areas of OWFs were too large that they unavoidably occupied and
squeezed the congested navigable waterways. Take Shanghai for example, by 2020,
Shanghai’s planned area of offshore wind power is 374.5 km2, accounting for 10.7%
of its total sea area; in the long run, the percentage will rise up to 41.4% (LIU et al.,
2015).
(ii)

In the construction phase. The construction phase is a period of time that has a

great influence on navigation, including frequent deployment of various types of
construction vessels for dredging of sea bottom, transportation and installation of
foundations and turbines, and laying of marine cables.
First, the Offshore Support Vessels (OSVs) navigating between port and designated
construction area will aggravate the navigation density, and have a certain impact on
traffic organization especially where the towboats are needed for transportation.
Second, the influence of foundation and wind turbine installation on navigation.
The piling vessel (PV) needs to anchor to maintain relatively static positions for
piling operation. Under normal circumstances, the PV is anchored with two pairs of
reversed open moorings, and ordinary moorings fore and aft, and the length of
anchor chains range from 150 to 500 metres. As a result, the vessel will occupy a
rounded water area with a radius of 150-500 metres centred on the foundation, as
shown in Figure 2.2. The anchor chains thrown by the vessel will become the
potential factor to induce accident thus hinder the navigation of the ships in the
vicinity. After the foundation is done and before the wind turbine is installed, the
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foundation becomes a new offshore structure, without proper marking it would bring
huge impact on safety of navigation. During the wind turbine installation process, the
anchoring method is roughly the same with foundation installation process, but only
with comparatively small water area occupied and less impact on safety of
navigation.

Figure 2.2 Anchoring drawing of the PV
Source: Reproduced from “The Study on the Construction and Vessel Navigation Safety of Offshore
Wind Farms”, by LIU, J.L.

2021, p.28.

http://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?FileName=ZSUX20200 7013&DbName=CJFQ2020

Third, the influence of marine cable laying on navigation. The Cables Laying Vessel
(CLV) is non-self-propelled vessel, which is usually assisted by towboat and
anchoring system to control its position. This maneuverability restriction makes CLV
hard to keep clear of other vessels effectively. When the vessel is operating in
waterway or customary route of ships, it’s necessary to take measures to close off
navigation in such water, which will affect the normal navigation of ships. After the
marine cables are laid, the waters perhaps will be prohibited from anchoring so as to
protect the cables, which will certainly change the navigation environment
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permanently.
(iii)

In the operating phase. Once an OWF completes its construction, it probably

will be in operation for more than twenty years, during which period of time it poses
profound influence to navigation environment.
First, the wind turbine’s interference on radio equipment such as radar, VHF, AIS, etc.
It is considered that the operation of the wind turbine makes it difficult for radar to
detect the target located in the wind farm, the accuracy of target tracing inside and
near the wind farm using ARPA radar can’t be guaranteed, and a certain shaded area
will be generated if the radar is close to wind turbine (LIU et al., 2010).
Second, the existence of an OWF has a certain impact on the surrounding natural
environment, for example, the operation of wind turbine will change the surrounding
wind field, the foundation of wind turbine will change the flow field and this in turn
will change the erosion and deposition trend of the seafloor. All those will directly or
indirectly affect the navigation environment of the adjacent waters.
Third, the OWF itself takes up a large amount of navigable water that will
permanently change the surrounding navigation environment by reducing the
navigable width and depth of waterway. In cases where ships navigating near the
OWF are subject to current-induced drift or human elements, there are chances that
the ships will collide with wind turbines.
(iv)

In the decommissioning phase. After 20 to 25 years’ of service, an OWF will

reach its final phase - Decommissioning (Kerkvliet & Polatidis, 2016). When an
OWF approaches the end of its service life, its owner can either choose to extend its
service life by repowering it, or decommission it. Most of OWFs’ decommissioning
are expected to begin in 2030 to 2035 since the first China’s OWF was established in
2010. Very little attention has been given to decommissioning of OWFs because the
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need of decommissioning is not pressing yet. And very few empirical data are
available so far except the limited experience from the decommissioning of oil and
gas installations. From the point of view of engineering, this phase can be deemed as
the reverse process of the construction phase. Therefore, the top structures of a wind
turbine will have to be removed first as shown in Figure 2.3, followed by the
dismantling of foundation, and ultimately the cables will be recovered. Several
challenges in decommissioning of an OWF must be given due considerations
including the working vessel availability, the impacts on safety of navigation and
marine environment. Inappropriate decommissioning approaches can be estimated to
be not only money consuming and but also detrimental to marine environment and
safety of navigation. The decommissioning cost of an OWF is estimated to be around
3% of the total capital cost (Beinke et al., 2018). There are chances that the poorly
managed OWF might be abandoned by the owner.

Figure 2.3 The decommissioning of the world’s first OWF - Vindeby
Source:

From “EU Offshore Wind”. https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/ydwNp4rb9nQ4bBiKpS3C_w

Various types of vessels will be used constantly during the decommissioning
procedure. Typically used vessels in the construction phase of an OWF such as Wind
Turbine Installation Vessels (WTIVs), Piling Vessels (PVs), Heavy Lift Vessels
(HLVs), Cables Laying Vessels (CLVs) and Offshore Support Vessels (OSVs) are
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also best alternatives for decommissioning activities. On one hand, these working
vessels are rare kind and hard to find due to the rapid development of offshore wind
industry. On the other hand, the continuous involvement of those vessels will
inevitably take up wide navigable waters and increase the traffic density, hence
jeopardize safety of navigation. Comparatively, the dismantling of foundations is
more challenging than the removal of top structures and the recovery of marine
cables. The key factor to be considered removing substructure of the foundation is
whether it’s to be dismantled completely (complete removal) or any parts are to be
left behind (partial removal). The baseline of international law and obligations, e.g.
UNCLOS, is complete removal of offshore installations, with exceptions according
to the IMO guidelines. The IMO guidelines set out six key components that should
be taken into account when deciding how much (if any) of a structure should be left
on the seabed (Gjødvad & Ibsen, 2016). The complete removal of the substructures
of an OWF is costly and not necessarily a sure card in that the substructures of an
OWF (including wind turbines, meteorological mast and substation) may have
become the perfect habitats for marine wild-lives such as reefs, fishes and crustacean
as presented in figure 2.4. Thus the compete removal may destroy the marine
environment that have been built naturally over the years. As opposed to complete
removal, partial removal has both environmental and economic benefits. Nonetheless,
if the substructure were to be dismantled partially leaving a considerable part below
the LAT and above the seafloor, it would probably endanger safety of navigation of
ships with deep draught, or engaging with bottom trawling. While wind turbines have
a designed lifespan of 20-25 years, the marine cables could last for 50 years. Those
cable are generally buried 1-2 metres under the seafloor, hence the complete removal
requires excavation and pulling out of the trenches. In view of their sheer length, this
would result in a major marine disruption as well as notable costs. Therefore, the
marine cables could be left in situ (Eva et al., 2019), but this is in conflict with the
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notion of “restitutio in integrum”, meaning that the site should be restored to the
shape as it was before the project was implemented. It can be concluded that the
emerging conflicts and challenges are attributed to be the absence of relevant
maritime regulatory framework.

Figure 2.4
Source:

Substructure as habitat for reefs and fishes

From “Diving strategy of a meteorological mast in Huizhou, Guangdong” .

https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/RHaESJtRN3GAD3B8B6Wx1g

2.2 Analyses of particular risk factors
Conceptually, risk is the probability of an unwanted event causing unintended
consequences, and it’s also a combination of the likelihood and consequences of a
particular dangerous situation (R = P x C, herein R means risk, P means probability
or likelihood, and C means consequences). As Prof. Schröder-Hinrichs (2019) stated
in his lecture, “no system or process is ever truly risk-free” (p. 7). An OWF involves
a lot of risks in its entire service life, all of which are derived from nature, port,
traffic, management and OWF itself.
However, this dissertation only intends to identify and analyse three salient but
non-exhaustive risk factors from the perspective of safety of navigation of ships. In
other words, those risk factors in question are also relevant to the problems that have
been identified in the aforementioned literature review, which will be discussed
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further in the following subsections of this chapter.
2.2.1 OWF siting
Siting is the core component of the design phase of an OWF. The common practice
for OWF siting in China generally contains three steps. First, the national and local
energy authorities draw up a plan for potential sites of OWFs, examine and approve
specific OWFs developers. Second, the approved OWFs developers apply to the
department of Marine administration for a license for the use of sea areas. Finally,
the approved OWFs developers apply for construction permit from MSA prior to the
construction phase. The National Energy Administration and State Oceanic
Administration jointly issued the “Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the
Interim Measures for the Management of Offshore Wind Power Development and
Construction” in July 2011, which aims to standardize and improve the construction
and management procedures of offshore wind power and promote the healthy and
orderly development of offshore wind power. It is explicitly stated that the OWFs
shall be sited in sea areas where the offshore distance is not less than 10 km, and the
depth of water is not less than 10 m if the width of intertidal zone is more than 10 km.
This basic OWF siting principle specifies the development path of China’s offshore
wind power, which has contributed to coordinating each sector in the need of sea
areas.
However, the engineering practice of OWF development reflects that the regulatory
regime doesn’t adapt to the rapid development of OWF. Just excluding the sensitive
areas of relevant regulations does not mean the planned potential sites are technically
feasible, nor does it mean that maritime related laws and regulations are met. In fact,
the maritime authorities should get actively involved in the OWF siting process,
otherwise the potential sites would probably be in conflict with safety of navigation.
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Take the meteorological mast construction of Zhuhai Jiapeng for example,
Guangdong MSA suggested to adjust its original position because it was very close
to customary route, but the developer refused to do so, which resulted two collision
accidents. In the end, the developer had no alternative but to start from scratch. Take
the game between Taiwan’s maritime sector and energy sector for another example.
The energy sector announced 36 Zones of Potential (ZoP) on July 2, 2015 (Thousand
Wind Turbine Project, 2021). Unfortunately, the plan didn’t take the ship’s routeing
announced by the maritime sector into account. As a result, twelve ZoP were rejected
by maritime sector, the preparing work in early stage and resource investment of
developers came to nothing. Figure 2.5 shows that the twelve ZoP were canceled due
to overlapping of routeing scheme and ZoP. Figure 2.6 gives the revised ZoP that the
maritime sector and energy sector agreed upon eventually.

Figure 2.5

Cancellation of 12 ZoP

Source: From “Thousand Wind Turbine Project”. https://www.twtpo.org.tw/index.aspx
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Figure 2.6 The revised ZoP
Source: From “Thousand Wind Turbine Project”. https://www.twtpo.org.tw/index.aspx

Regarding OWF siting in the light of sustainable development in the already heavily
used offshore marine realm, a holistic approach - Marine Spacial Planning (MSP) has
been applied in many countries. MSP is defined by UNESCO as a public process of
analysing and allocating the spatial and temporal distribution of human activities in
marine areas to achieve ecological, economic and social objectives that are typically
specified through the political process. Historically, MSP has been driven by the need
to preserve ecological zones and was started as a management approach for nature
conservation in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park over 30 years ago. More recently,
it has been adopted in the more crowded seas of European countries and several
countries in Asia, including China and Vietnam, which are now using MSP to
achieve both economic and environmental objectives (The World Association for
Waterborne Transport Infrastructure, 2018).
The GIS-based framework is a suitable tool to analyse synergies regarding marine
space issues among different users, to offer guidance to stakeholders and assist
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decision-makers in determining the most suitable sites for pilot projects. The
co-location of OWF and aquaculture might be seen as a milestone towards
sustainable MSP in the German EEZ (Gimpel et al., 2015). Tercan et al. (2020)
developed an integrated methodology which combined multi-criteria decision
making methods and GIS and was implemented in Greece and Turkey. This spatial
suitability analysis may contribute to providing some useful recommendations for the
MSP at the regional scale, as well as for the preliminary assessment of new OWFs in
both countries. Apart from countries above, Spain (Rodríguez-Rodríguez et al., 2016),
USA (Smythe et al., 2019), Belgium (Douvere et al., 2007), UK and the Netherlands
(Stephen, 2010) have also implemented MSP approach in the OWF siting.
2.2.2 The minimum safety distance
The determination of minimum safety distance from an OWF to the recommended
route, customary route and anchorage is crucial for both safety of navigation and
OWF, through which the maritime authorities can exercise effective traffic control.
Different minimum safety distance models have been proposed from different
perspectives. First, from the perspective of vessel drift induced collision, WANG et
al. (2020) established a minimum safety distance calculation model based on
improved not-under-command drift model, considering the characteristic of the
vessel itself, safety zone required for normal operation of wind turbine, wind induced
drift and current induced drift, etc. Then take the 150,000-ton bulk carrier,
50,000-ton container ship, 150,000-ton oil tanker and 50,000-ton chemical tanker
navigating in sea areas of Ru Dong, Jiang Su province for examples, calculations of
safety distances in different combination of wind and current were conducted, and
eventually the minimum safety distance of 2,800 m was determined for the not under
command vessels to avoid collision with wind turbine. Second, from the perspective
of the collision probability between ship and OWF, NIE et al. (2019) developed a
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ship-OWF collision probability calculation model. The test result showed that the
collision probability was closely related to the distance between OWF and waterway,
based on which the probability can be reduced by supervising the distance between
OWF and waterway. The authors adopted the German acceptable risk criterion for
collision risk studies on offshore installations, setting the acceptable probability to
0.0067 ships/year. Thereby the safety distance calculation model was formulated
within the acceptable collision risk level, and the safety distance of 1,300 ~ 3,000 m
between OWF and waterway was finally calculated. Third, from the perspective of
collision avoidance regulations, one Working Group convened by Maritime
Navigation Commission of PIANC produced a report (PIANC, 2018) on the
interaction between OWFs and maritime navigation, among which acknowledged
experts based on COLREGs regulations and guidelines proposed the minimum safety
distance model between shipping route and OWF as follows:
(1) Starboard side of any route: 0.3 NM + 6 ship lengths + 500 m; and
(2) Port side of any route: 6 ship lengths + 500 m.
Notes:
• 0.3 NM is the distance that a ship deviates from original track right before it
starts a round turn.
• 6 ship lengths is determined as the diameter of a round turn.
• 500 m is the safety zone4 for protection of OWF structure.
Moreover, OWFs generate radar interference in addition to the effect of swapping
targets. The safety distance to avoid interference has been determined by deep sea
pilots to be 0.8 NM and surveys have identified a minimum distance of 1.5 NM from
a OWF is necessary to minimise the interference on ship born radar and the
According to UNCLOS Article 60 paragraph 4, the coastal State may, where necessary, establish reasonable
safety zones around such artificial islands, installations and structures in which it may take appropriate measures
to ensure the safety both of navigation and of the artificial islands, installations and structures. And the reserved
safety zone has been defined as 500 metres.
4
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automatic radar plotting acquisition (PIANC, 2018).
Yet, the pending question is left for maritime authorities to recommend how much is
the distance considered to be safe and minimum, and eventually the mariners have to
decide how near they can endure to pass clear of a wind turbine.
2.2.3 The marking of OWF
An OWF is usually formed by a wide array of wind turbines, arranged in a regular
way that they will inevitably pose risks to safety of navigation and reshape traffic
flow. In order for ships to avoid collision with wind turbines, the OWF shall be
appropriately marked with AtoNs, such as light buoys, light beacons, AIS AtoN and
fog signals. AtoN is a device, system or service, external to vessels, designed and
operated to enhance safe and efficient navigation of individual vessels and/or vessel
traffic. According to SOLAS chapter V, regulation 13, each Contracting Government
undertakes to provide, as it deems practical and necessary either individually or in
cooperation with other Contracting Governments, such aids to navigation as the
volume of traffic justifies and the degree of risk requires (IMO, 2018).
There are three national and international regulations for reference when it comes to
the marking of OWFs in China. First, Maritime Buoyage System, China, GB
4696-2016; Second, The Regulation for Marking of Offshore structures in China,
GB17380-1998; Third, IALA Recommendation R0139, “The Marking of Man-Made
Offshore Structures”. Based on a survey conducted within the AtoN departments of
China5, a majority of OWFs have been marked in accordance with GB 4696-2016
and IALA Recommendation R0139, only a minority have been marked in accordance
with GB 17380-1998. Table 2.2 lists different markings of some representative
OWFs in China.
In China, AtoN department from the organizational level perspective is a three-level organ affiliated under
Ministry of Transport , meanwhile is subject to superior management of China MSA.
5
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Table 2.2 The markings of some representative OWFs in China
NO.

OWF

1

Characteristics of light
Light buoys

Light beacons

Long Yuan 480 MW OWF

M “C” Y 12 s

M “C” Y 12 s

2

Shanghai East Bridge 100 MW OWF

M “P” Y 12 s

M “C” Y 15 s

3

Putian Pinghai Bay 50 MW OWF

M “O” Y 12 s

NIL

NIL

M “C” Y 12 s

M “O” Y 12 s

NIL

4
5

Binhai H2
Meteorological Mast
Leting Yuetuo Island
Meteorological Mast

6

National Electric 5#
Meteorological Mast

M “C” Y 12 s

NIL

7

Zhuhai Jiapeng
Meteorological Mast

NIL

M “U” W 12 s

Source:

Compiled by the author based on survey.

Notes: M = Morse; Y = Yellow, W = White, representing light colour; s = seconds, representing light
rhythm; C means the special mark for offshore structure in GB 4696-2016; P means the special mark
for prohibited area; O means the special mark for marine operation area; and U means special mark
for offshore structure in GB 17380-1998.

It can be seen from the table that the markings of OWF and isolated meteorological
mast were inconsistent due to the adoption of different regulations. For OWFs using
M “C” Y 12 s, IALA Recommendation R0139 was adopted. For OWFs using M “P”
Y 12 s and M “C” Y 15 s, both GB 4696-2016 and IALA Recommendation R0139
were adopted. For meteorological masts using M “O” Y 12s and M “C” Y 12 s, GB
4696-2016 was adopted. For meteorological masts using M “U” W 12 s, either GB
17380-1998 or IALA Recommendation R0139 was adopted. The problem arising
from this inconsistency of adoption of regulations is that AtoN users particularly
mariners would be really confused in observing and identifying the diversified
markings of OWFs including isolated meteorological masts. Undoubtedly, this
ambiguity or inconsistency will undermine the efficacy of AtoNs.
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Chapter 3

Navigational Risk Assessment of Offshore
Wind Farm

3.1 Introduction of risk assessment models
There are plenty of risk assessment methods developed so far, all of which basically
fall within two kinds: quantitative methods using “objective” data and qualitative
methods

using

“subjective”

expert

judgement

(Schröder-Hinrichs,

2020).

Quantitative risk assessment methods include Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA), Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) and Risk Contribution Tree
(RCT), etc. Qualitative risk assessment methods include Failure mode, effects and
criticality analysis (FMEA/FMECA), Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP),
Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation (FCE) and Bayesian Networks (BN), etc.
Risk assessment models, on the other hand, are replications of real-life systems and
processes. Many scholars, over the years, have developed risk assessment models for
many scenarios (Mehdi & Schröder-Hinrichs, 2016). For examples, Mehdi et al.
(2020) proposed a dynamic risk assessment model to address safety of navigation
concerns around offshore renewable energy installations, it could be used by
operational users such as VTS operators, pilots, shore-control centers and seafarers to
make better and risk-informed decisions during the operation of vessels near OWFs
in restricted, high-traffic-density areas. YU et al. (2020) developed a semi-qualitative
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risk model to assess the ship-wind turbine collision risks by incorporating Bayesian
networks (BN) with evidential reasoning (ER) approaches. However, it has been
acknowledged that the NRA conducted by different organizations have received
discrepant results for the same OWF. This discrepancy in calculations arises because
different countries and organizations use different calculation models and procedures
(Mehdi & Schröder-Hinrichs, 2016). Table 3.1 gives a comparison of the NRA
processes in eight countries. Currently, the China’s management provisions on safety
of navigation of water borne activities are general terms, and there is no
recommendation on which NRA models or tools could be used.

Thus, the use of

models or tools during NRA is diversified, the OWF developer may have to use a
qualitative approach with experts judgement, but could the invited experts represent
the interests of all relevant stakeholders? Or the developer may have to choose a
quantitative model, but is the model transparent? The report of Ellis et al. (2008)
implied that it was impossible to replicate the calculation results of certain models, as
the equations and data values being used were not evident (as cited by Mehdi &
Schröder-Hinrichs, 2016). The real issue of this diversification is that different
assessment results could be achieved at the same OWF using different models.
Additionally, it may be also a bureaucratic burden for the developers because they
need to follow different assessment procedures. This is clearly an issue that needs to
be addressed urgently.
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Table 3.1
No.

Comparison of NRA process in the eight countries

Question

UK

1

Is a marine licence necessary for
OWF approval in your country?

2

Is a NRA necessary for OWF
approval in your country?

3

Who is responsible for conducting
this NRA?

4

Do you have any national
guidelines on NRA?

5

Do you require the use of any
specific models, tools or methods
when a NRA is conducted?

6

Are there any specific factors that
must be considered in a NRA -e.g.
- specific ship type, size,speed,
weather conditions, etc.?

7

Are there any guidelines for
approving a wind farm with
regards to navigation safety?

DE

DK

NL

BE

SE

US

CN

No, but
generally
included.

Yes

Yes

Yes
Maritime
authority

OWF Developer
Yes
No. Recommend
FSA; ANATEC’s
COLLRISK Model
commonly used
often by developers
to compare base
case vs. future case
risk.

OWF Developer

Internal only

Yes. German Hazardous Incident
Ordinance, the British Safety Case
Regulations for offshore installations,
IMO regulations for risk assessment
to be followed. Models from DNV
GL most commonly used by
developers to compare base case vs.
future case risk.

No. Recommend FSA;
DNV MARCS model,
and models from COWI
and Rambøll most
commonly used by
developers to compare
base case vs. future case
risk.

Yes
No. Recommend
FSA; MARIN’s
SAMSON model
used most
commonly to
compare base
case vs. future
case risk.

No. Recommend
FSA; MARIN’s
SAMSON model
used most
commonly to
compare base
case vs. future
case risk.

No. Recommend
IWRAP MKII
model; SSPA
model most
commonly used by
developers to
compare base case
vs.future case risk.

No.
Recommend
‘What-if’
analysis
amongst
other tools.

No. Recommend
assessment approaches
as follows:
comprehensive
analysis of data;
mathematical model;
simulation; sea trials;
expert consultation.

Ship traffic, speeds and types through AIS data, dynamic (wind, wave, tides, currents, etc.) and static (bathymetry,
hydrographic features, layout of channels, etc.) environmental conditions, OWF location and layout.

No. Case by
case basis.

Yes. turbine must be collision
friendly, and not rupture hull of a
predetermined vessel drifting into it
at 2m/s.

No. Case by case basis.
*In DK, turbine must be collision friendly.

Notes: UK = United Kingdom, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, NL = The Netherlands, BE = Belgium, SE = Sweden, US = United States of America, CN =
China.
Source:

Adapted from “Improving the coexistence of offshore wind farms and shipping: an international comparison of navigational risk assessment

processes”, by Mehdi et al., 2018, p.407. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13437-018-0149-0
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3.2 The navigation environment of the research waters
3.2.1 Overview of Binhai OWF
Binhai OWF is situated in the offshore sea area between Zhongshan Estuary and
Binhai Port, northwest of harbour boundary of Binhai Port. It generally contains two
blocks of OWFs that have been established separately in around 2017 and 2018.
The general location of the two blocks (H1 OWF & H2 OWF) is delineated in Figure
3.1. The Binhai H1 OWF consists of twenty-five rectangularly distributed wind
turbines with unit capacity of 4.0 MW and total installed capacity of 100 MW. The
offshore distance is about 7.5 km, the topography of the sea floor changes gently
with the water depth ranging mostly between 7-13 metres. The Binhai H2 OWF
consists of a hundred polygonally distributed wind turbines with unit capacity of 4.0
MW and total installed capacity of 400 MW. The offshore distance is about 22 km,
and the depth of water ranging from 15 to 18 metres.

Figure 3.1 The siting of Binhai OWF
Source: Produced by the author.

3.2.2 Meteorological conditions
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The OWF is located in the middle latitudes of the northern hemisphere. The humid
monsoon climate dominates in this area, and the wind direction varies drastically
seasonally, with southeasterly winds prevailing in summer and northeasterly winds in
winter. The following data are based on the statistics of annual observation of Binhai
meteorological station over the years.
(1) Temperature
The average temperature: 14.1 ℃;
The extreme maximum temperature: 38.5 ℃; and
The utmost lowest temperature: -15 ℃.
(2) Precipitation
The average precipitation: 949.5 mm; and
The maximum annual precipitation: 1381.2 mm.
The region is rainy in summer and dry in winter. The precipitation is mainly
concentrated from June to September, accounting for 66% of the total annual
precipitation. The maximum annual precipitation is 1381.2 mm, and the maximum
precipitation per day is 162.5mm (it appeared in June 1999). The average annual
precipitation days are 121.5 days.
(3) Wind condition
According to the observation statistics of the Binhai Oceanic Station, the strong wind
direction is E, with measured maximum wind speed of 23.0 m/s. The second strong
wind direction is ENE with speed of 21.3 m/s. The directions with the maximum
wind speed above 20 m/s include NNE, NE, ENE, E, ESE and SE. The direction of
the maximum average annual wind speed is NNE with the average annual speed of
7.14 m/s. The direction of prevailing wind is SE with the occurrence frequency of
10.9 %. The occurrence frequency of N~E~S directions is more than 7 %, and the
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total occurrence frequency of these directions is about 70 %. The frequency of
NNW~W~SSW in all directions is relatively small, less than 6.3 %. The annual
average gale of force 6-7 in the sea area is about 60~70 days, and the number of days
of force ≥7 gale is 14.8 days. Based on the wind statistics of Binhai Oceanic Station
between September 1997 and December 2006, Table 3.2 (the average and maximum
wind speed in each direction), Figure 3.2 (frequency rose in each direction) and
Figure 3.3 (wind rose) are produced as follows.
Table 3.2

The average and maximum wind speed in each direction by Binhai

Oceanic Station (unit: m/s)
Direction
Average
value
Maximum
value
Direction
Average
value
Maximum
value

N

NNE

NE

ENE

E

ESE

SE

SSE

6.34

7.14

6.55

6.35

5.34

5.28

5.61

6.13

18.9

20.7

21

21.3

23

20.6

20.3

20.5

S

SSW

SW

WSW

W

WNW

NW

NNW

5.44

4.02

3.89

4.16

3.73

4.2

4.32

5.25

14.9

14

13.5

13.5

16

12.3

13.9

17.6

Source: Reproduced from “Aids to Navigation Project Design of Binhai OWF”.

Figure 3.2

Frequency rose of wind in each direction

Source: Reproduced from “Aids to Navigation Project Design of Binhai OWF”.
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Figure 3.3 Wind rose in each direction
Source: Reproduced from “Aids to Navigation Project Design of Binhai OWF”.

(4) Fog
Fog in this sea area usually occurs in the turn of the spring and summer, or the
autumn and winter. According to meteorological statistics of Xintan Salt Farm, the
average number of foggy days over the years is 39.9 days. According to the statistics
of Binhai Oceanic Station from 2000 to 2003, the foggy days with visibility ≤ 1 km
are 14 days and the longest duration is 83 hours.
(5) Thunderstorm
The average number of thunderstorm days over the years in this region is 25.8 days,
and the maximum number of thunderstorm days in the past years is 30.0 days, with
the most occurring in June to August.
(6) Typhoon
In recent years (1997~2015), a total of 53 tropical cyclones had affected Jiangsu
Province, among which twenty made a large impact. The coastal areas of Jiangsu
Province are likely to be affected by tropical cyclones from May to November every
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year. The sea area where the OWF is located is offshore and wide open. The wind
speed and strength are both greater than those in the land.
3.2.3 Hydrologic conditions
(1) Wave
The usual wave direction is ESE, with a frequency of 25.39 %, followed by E, ENE
and NE, with a frequency of 18.85 %, 10.96 % and 10.81 % respectively. This is
related to the prevailing southeast monsoon in the sea area of northern Jiangsu. There
are no offshore waves in SSW, SW and WSW. The strong wave directions include
NW and NE with NE being the strongest direction. Figure 3.4 shows the frequency
rose of wind direction.

Figure 3.4 The frequency rose of wind direction
Source: Reproduced from “Aids to Navigation Project Design of Binhai OWF”.

(2) Tidal current
The tidal current in this sea area is dominated by rectilinear current. The flood tide is
from northwest to southeast, the ebb tide is from southeast to northwest. The
directions of flood tide are between 105° ~ 156°, and the directions of ebb tide are
between 253° ~ 33°. The maximum velocity of the tidal current at measurement

34

point during the spring and autumn is 1.91 m/s and 1.58 m/s respectively, and the
maximum velocity of ebb tide is 2.06 m/s and 1.79 m/s respectively.
3.2.4 Port conditions
Binhai port is situated in between south and southeast of Binhai OWF with a
straight-line distance of 5 NM approximately. According to the “Development Plan
of Jiangsu Coastal Areas”, Binhai port has been designated to serve the development
of port industries primarily energy industries. By the beginning of 2018, seven berths
ranging from 35,000 tons to 100,000 tons had been completed. Hopefully, the
300,000-ton deep-water terminal will be accomplished in the near future. Currently,
Binhai port is a category-two port, accessible for ocean-going vessels of Chinese
nationality.
3.2.5 Shipping routes conditions
According to “Shipping Route Planning of Jiangsu Coastal Waters”, there are
generally four shipping routes adjacent to Binhai OWF as delineated in Figure 3.5.
(1) The deep-water route approaching Guanhe kou northbound. Way point 1:
33°22.5' N / 123°E; Way point 2：33°47.4' N / 122°38' E; Way point 3：34°14' N /
122°15' E; Way point 4：34°30.5' N / 121°31' E；Way point 5：34°34' N / 120°41' E;
and Way point 6：34°37.2' N / 120°0.4' E. The closest distance to Binhai H2 OWF is
3.1 NM.
(2) The shallow-water route approaching Guanhe kou northbound. Way point 1:
31°37' N / 123°E; Way point 2：32°29.7' N / 122°33.6' E; Way point 3：33°48.5' N /
121°52.5' E; Way point 4: 34°34' N / 120°41' E; and Way point 5: 34°37.2' N /
120°0.4' E. The closest distance to Binhai H2 OWF is 3.1 NM.
(3) The two-way route between Guanhe kou and Binhai. Way point 1: 34°29′32.4″N
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/ 120°20′16″E ; Way point 2: 34°21′12″N / 120°20′23″E; and Way point 3:
34°17′15″N / 120°20′23″E. The closest distance to Binhai H1 OWF is 1.8 NM. The
closest distance to Binhai H2 OWF is 3.8 NM.
(4)

The shallow-water route approaching Lian Yungang northbound. Way point 1:

31°37′N / 123°E; Way point 2: 32°29.7′N / 122°33.6′E; Way point 3: 33°48.5′N /
121°52.5′E; and Way point 4: 34°53′N / 119°58′E. The closest distance to Binhai H2
OWF is 3.7 NM.

Figure 3.5 The shipping routes adjacent to Binhai OWF
Source: Produced by the author based on the “Shipping Route Planning of Jiangsu Coastal Waters”.

3.2.6 Statistical analysis of water traffic accidents
According to the statistical analyses of water accidents carried out by Lian Yungang
MSA covering the coastal area of Lian Yungang (coastline: 582.3 km) and the coastal
area of Yan Cheng (coastline: 176.5 km), there were twenty-one accidents occurred
throughout 2019 as shown in Table 3.3, among which two were major accidents, six
were ordinary accidents and thirteen were minor accidents as shown in Table 3.4. All
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accidents fell into six types including collision, grounding, allision, fire explosion,
foundering, operational pollution and else as shown in Table 3.5.
Table 3.3

The statistics of water traffic accidents throughout 2019 in the

jurisdiction sea area of Lian Yungang MSA
Number of
accidents

Financial loss (Ten
thousand yuan)

Number of
sunken ships

Loss of
lives

Number of
punishment

Fine
(Yuan)

21

2606.60

2

16

0

0

Total

Source: Reproduced from “Statistics of water traffic accidents of Lian Yungang MSA in 2019”, by
Lian Yungang MSA, 2019. http://www.lyg.msa.gov.cn/ssjtaq/49360.jhtml

Table 3.4

Total

Grading of water traffic accidents

Extraordinarily
serious accidents

Major accidents

Ordinary accidents

Minor accidents

0

2

6

13

Source: Reproduced from “Statistics of water traffic accidents of Lian Yungang MSA in 2019”, by
Lian Yungang MSA, 2019. http://www.lyg.msa.gov.cn/ssjtaq/49360.jhtml

Table 3.5 Types of water traffic accidents
Types

Collision

Grounding

Stranding

Allision

Swell damage

Total

14

1

0

6

0

Types

Fire explosion

Wind damage

Foundering

Operational
pollution

Else

Total

2

0

6

3

1

Source: Reproduced from “Statistics of water traffic accidents of Lian Yungang MSA in 2019”, by
Lian Yungang MSA, 2019. http://www.lyg.msa.gov.cn/ssjtaq/49360.jhtml

Among the twenty-one accidents in 2019, there was one particular accident relating
to OWF. On March 25, 2019, the cargo ship “Su Lian Yungang 8866” was on its way
from Qingdao, Shandong Province to Fan Shenhe fishing port in Binhai, Jiangsu
Province. At 2354 hours, the ship collided with the foundation of No. 38 wind
turbine of Binhai H2 OWF in the southern waters of the Yellow Sea (34°30′.6 N /
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120°15′.1 E) as shown in Figure 3.6, causing the sinking of “Su Lian Yungang 8866”,
death of three crew members and missing of the other three crew members, left the
foundation with slight damage as shown in Figure 3.7. This collision accident
constituted a major water traffic accident. The accident investigation report
announced by Lian Yungang MSA provided a comprehensive analysis of the causes
of the accident as follows, determining that the accident was the fault of one party,
“Su Lian Yungang 8866” took full responsibility.
(1) Failed to keep proper lookout;
(2) Failed to take early actions to avoid collision;
(3) The ship was not seaworthy;
(4) The crew members were not competent;
(5) The registered operator of the ship failed to perform the duty of safety
management; and
(6) The actual owner and operator of the ship failed to perform safety and
pollution prevention responsibilities.

Figure 3.6

Collision and sinking positions of “ Su Lian Yungang 8866”

Source: Reproduced from “Accident investigation report of the collision between Su Lian Yungang
8866 and No. 38 Wind turbine of Binhai H2 OWF”, by Lian Yungang MSA, 2019, p.10.
http://www.lyg.msa.gov.cn/html/ssaqsgxx/20191210/48300.html
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Figure 3.7 The damage incurred by the collision accident
Source: Reproduced from “Accident investigation report of the collision between Su Lian Yungang
8866 and No. 38 Wind turbine of Binhai H2 OWF”, by Lian Yungang MSA, 2019, p.18.
http://www.lyg.msa.gov.cn/html/ssaqsgxx/20191210/48300.html

3.3 Navigational risk assessment of Binhai OWF
OpenCPN is a concise and robust Chart Plotter Navigating software program that
meets the requirements of IMO. It supports the functions of worldwide standard S57
and encrypted S63 vector chart display, AIS input with full target-tracking and
collision alerting, route planning and route navigation with ship tracking functions,
etc. The functionalities of OpenCPN can be expanded with plugins, for instance, the
statistical platform of vessel traffic flow characteristics based on AIS data can be
developed and plugged in. The static and dynamic information of ships can be
extracted from the AIS data. Studies on vessel traffic volume, density, trajectory,
speed and distance can be conducted using AIS data, from which the relevant vessel
traffic flow characteristics could be mined. This software is conducive to the rapid
statistics of vessel traffic flow characteristics, providing data support for the
navigational risk assessment procedure. Therefore, OpenCPN is used in this
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dissertation to facilitate the navigational risk assessment of Binhai OWF.
3.3.1 Statistical analyses of vessel traffic flow
First, a rectangular working area has been selected covering the whole Binhai OWF,
the four vertexes coordinates of the rectangular working area are presented in Table
3.6. Second, the AIS source data of ships within a certain time frame (between
September 25, 2020 and April 5, 2021) in the selected sea area were extracted from
Lian Yungang AtoN department, and then got parsed. Finally, the parsed data were
imported to OpenCPN, and risk assessment results were obtained as follows.
Table 3.6 The four vertexes coordinates of the rectangular working area
Vertex

Coordinates (CGCS-2000)
N

E

1

34°22'33.00"

120°09'19.00"

2

34°22'33.00"

120°28'29.00"

3

34°32'34.00"

120°28'29.00"

4

34°32'34.00"

120°09'19.00"

Source: Produced by the author.

(1) The historical trajectories of all the ships navigating inside the working area
within the certain time frame were synthesized and illustrated in Figure 3.8. It can be
seen from the chart that plenty of ships were navigating within and in close vicinity
of Binhai OWF.
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Figure 3.8
The historical trajectories of ships in the working area between
September 25, 2020 and April 5, 2021
Source: Assessment result exported from OpenCPN.

(2) For statistical purposes, three cross sections have been established as shown in
Table 3.7. Cross section 1 passes through the inshore shipping route between Guanhe
and Binhai, cross section 2 passes though Binhai H1 OWF, and cross section 3 passes
through Binhai H2 OWF.
Table 3.7 The coordinates of the three cross sections
Cross sections
1
2
3

A
B
A
C
B
D

Coordinates (CGCS-2000)

N
34°24′44″
34°29′
34°24′44″
34°23′ 42″
34°29′
34°31′ 28″

E
120°12′25″
120°17′12″
120°12′25″
120°11′05″
120°17′12″
120°28′28″

Source: Produced by the author.

The distributions of vessel traffic flow at the first cross section is presented in Figure
3.9. The types of vessels and quantities have been analysed as shown in Table 3.8,
and the dimensions of vessels and quantities are given in Table 3.9, among which the
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largest vessel passing by had the overall length of 270 m, breadth of 30 m.

Figure 3.9 The distributions of vessel traffic flow at the first cross section
Notes: The blue area represents the northbound vessels and the red area represents
the southbound vessels.
Source: Assessment result exported from OpenCPN.

Table 3.8

Statistics on vessels by type at the first cross section

Types of vessels

Quantity (ship)

Proportion

Traffic flow (ships)

Cargo vessel

64

56.6%

177

Fishing vessel

25

22.1%

46

Towboat

8

7.1%

14

Container vessel

2

1.8%

4

Tanker

4

3.5%

19

Recreational vessel

2

1.8%

3

Law enforcement vessel

1

0.9%

2

Other vessels

7

6.2%

13

Total

113

100%

278

Source: Produced by the author.
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Table 3.9

Statistics on vessels by dimension at the first cross section

Dimensions of vessels (m)

[0-30]

[30-50]

[50-90]

[90-180]

>180

Quantity (ship)

14

26

34

36

3

Proportion

12.4%

23.0%

30.1%

31.8%

2.7%

Source: Produced by the author.

The distributions of vessel traffic flow at the second cross section is presented in
Figure 3.10. The types of vessels and quantities have been analysed as shown in
Table 3.10, and the dimensions of vessels and quantities are given in Table 3.11.

Figure 3.10 The distributions of vessel traffic flow at the second cross section
Notes: The blue area represents the northbound vessels and the red area represents
the southbound vessels.
Source: Assessment result exported from OpenCPN.

Table 3.10

Statistics on vessels by type at the second cross section

Types of vessels

Quantity (ship)

Proportion

Traffic flow (ships)

Cargo vessel

2

33.33%

4

Fishing vessel
Other vessels
Total

2
2
6

33.33%
33.33%
100%

21
8
33

Source: Produced by the author.
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Table 3.11 Statistics on vessels by dimension at the second cross section
Dimensions of vessels (m)

[0-30]

[30-50]

[50-90]

[90-180]

>180

Quantity (ship)

3

1

2

0

0

Proportion

50.0%

16.7%

33.3%

0.0%

0.0%

Source: Produced by the author.

The distributions of vessel traffic flow at the third cross section is presented in Figure
3.11. The types of vessels and quantities have been analysed as shown in Table 3.12,
and the dimensions of vessels and quantities are given in Table 3.13.

Figure 3.11 The distributions of vessel traffic flow at the third cross section
Notes: The blue area represents the northbound vessels and the red area represents
the southbound vessels.
Source: Assessment result exported from OpenCPN.

Table 3.12

Statistics on vessels by type at the third cross section

Types of vessels

Quantity (ship)

Proportion

Traffic flow (ships)

Cargo vessel

11

35.5%

30

Fishing vessel

16

51.6%

39

Offshore support vessel

2

6.5%

9

44

Tanker

1

3.2%

4

Recreational vessel

1

3.2%

1

Total

31

100%

83

Source: Produced by the author.

Table 3.13

Statistics on vessels by dimension at the third cross section

Dimensions of vessels (m)

[0-30]

[30-50]

[50-90]

[90-180]

>180

Quantity (ship)

8

12

8

3

0

Proportion

25.8%

38.7%

25.8%

9.7%

0.0%

Source: Produced by the author.

3.3.2 The novel mathematical calculation of DCA and ADA
The above statistical analyses on vessel traffic flow characteristics using Open CPN
have provided us with visual and intuitive cognition on the navigation status of ships
in the vicinity of Binhai OWF. In order to learn more about risk of navigation
through an objective way, this dissertation puts forward for the first time a
mathematical method to calculate the Distance of Closest Approach (DCA) and
Average Distance of Approach (ADA) between passing ships and OWF based on AIS
data of the ships.
All the vessels of displacement that are traveling will leave trails in the water by
fueling the waves. Simultaneously, the trails or rather trajectories could be also
logged electronically in the AIS-based systems, then displayed graphically on ECDIS,
OpenCPN, etc. The AIS data extracted from Lian Yungang AtoN department contain
the trajectories of the vessels that have navigated in the inshore shipping route
between Guanhe and Binhai, and passed through the first cross section. The
accumulated lines of trajectories have formed a “Trajectory Plane” as illustrated in
Figure 3.8 and 3.9. The theory of this novel method and practical application are
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elaborated as follows.
First of all, establishment of the calculation formulas. Suppose the horizontal line
segment MN is a cross section that crosses a shipping route, and a ship is projected
vertically on the plane as shown in Figure 3.12. The point O at the centre of the
breadth of the ship is the point where GPS antenna is installed, in other words, O
presents the GPS position of the ship.

The heading course of the ship is C when she

crosses the MN, and the breadth of the ship is B. If the positioning error, leeway and
drift are ignored, the distance between M and P (the intersection point of MN and
port side of the projection), and between N and S (the intersection point of MN and
starboard side of the projection) can be expressed as:
MP  | MO | -

NS  | NO | -

B
B
;
 | MO | 2sin(90  C )
2cosC

B
B
.
 | NO | 2sin(90  C )
2cosC

Note： the unit of B is metre, the unit of C is degree.

Figure 3.12

The cross section MN and vertical projection of a ship

Source: Produced by the author.

If the cross section is not horizontal, and there is an angle β between the cross section
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and latitude as shown in Figure 3.13, thus the discussions are divided into three
scenarios.
(1) The latitude of N is higher than that of M. The distance between M and P, and
between N and S can be expressed as:
MP  | MO | -

B
;
2cos(   C )

NS  | NO | -

B
.
2cos(   C )

(2) The latitude of N is lower than that of M, and C>β. The distance between M and
P, and between N and S can be expressed as:
MP  | MO | -

B
;
2cos(C   )

NS  | NO | -

B
.
2cos(C   )

(3) The latitude of N is lower than that of M, and C<β. The distance between M and
P, and between N and S can be expressed as:
MP  | MO | -

B
;
2cos(  - C )

Figure 3.13

Positional relation between heading course and MN

NS  | NO | -

B
.
2cos(  - C )

Source: Produced by the author.

Now the calculations for the first cross section can be carried out using the formula
above. The Vertexes A and B are the points located on the peripheries of Binhai OWF.
The required values of related vessels such as heading courses, coordinates and
breadth of vessels have been fetched. Ultimately, the distance of closest approach to
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Binhai H1 OWF and Binhai H2 OWF, the average distance of approach to Binhai H1
OWF and Binhai H2 OWF have been calculated and shown in Table 3.14.
Table 3.14 The calculation results for Binhai OWF using the novel method
DCA (m)

ADA (m)

506.5

2482.3

The distance to Point B of Binhai H2 OWF 555.4

9969.5

The distance to Point A of Binhai H1 OWF

Source: Produced by the author.

As can be seen from the calculation results, some vessels passed the OWF with a
very small distance of 0.27 NM approximately, which is certainly not a safe passing
distance that are recommended by various scholars as mentioned in chapter 2. This
novel mathematical method has provided a potential quantitative approach for the
maritime authorities to carry out navigational risk assessment.
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Chapter 4

Recommendations on Maritime Safety

Supervision and Navigation Service
Chapter 1 Article 3 of the Maritime Traffic Safety Law of the People’s Republic of
China, states that “the use of the sea for transportation is protected by the country
pursuant to the law”. China MSA in accordance with the law performs the maritime
supervision duties, maintains the order of maritime traffic and ensures the safety of
navigation of domestic and foreign ships navigating in the vicinity of OWFs. In
December 2017, to serve the development and construction of OWF, China MSA
drafted the Guidance on Enhancing Maritime Safety Supervision of OWF, which
specifies the concept of “Feedforward, Concurrent and Feedback Control”, realizing
entire process management of OWFs.
This chapter will, from the perspectives of maritime supervision and navigation
service, work out risk control options (RCOs) that are designated for improving
safety of navigation of ships in the vicinity of OWFs. The RCOs are categorized
according to four phases of OWF, the RCOs for design, construction and
decommissioning phases are general measures, applicable for common OWFs. In
light of the result obtained in the navigational risk assessment of Binhai OWF, the
RCOs prescribed in the operating phase will be more nichetargeting and specific.

4.1 RCOs in the design phase of OWF
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The OWF siting after completion of construction will have long-term implications
for safety of navigation. Currently, the improper siting of OWFs is the immediate
causation of increase of traffic density, which mediately induces maritime accidents.
On the other hand, it is the energy authority in China who has the national power to
decide and approve the siting of OWFs, and the maritime authority usually has no
much say in this. Therefore, it is recommended that the maritime authorities should
proactively participate in the OWF siting as early as possible, preferably during the
project approval process and the processes thereafter, in order for the OWF leading
authority to be aware of maritime concerns, needs and risks. Apart from the active
participation in the institutional level, the maritime authorities could play a much
bigger role in the technical level.
One one hand, enhance the involvement of MSP. The main purpose of MSP is to
achieve a balanced approach towards safety of navigation, protection of environment,
and effectiveness of economy and society (IALA, 2017). It could be a perfect tool for
coordination and harmonisation of the use of marine spaces among various
stakeholders. The MSP requires the GIS to organise and present data, the most
essential data source derives from maritime data including ship traffic densities (AIS
data), routes, accidents, expected growth (of density and/or ship sizes), intended
routeing measures, etc., which should be provided in such a way that it may easily be
imported into the GIS. Hence, the maritime authorities should make the maritime
data readily accessible to facilitate the MSP in the process of OWF siting.
On the other hand, formulate the maritime criteria of OWF siting based on
engineering practice and relevant studies. Generally speaking, the OWF siting should
keep clear of shipping routes, anchorages and prohibited areas, and it’s a good
practice to design the OWF in such a manner that the array of wind turbines are in
parallel to the shipping route. Specifically speaking, a NRA should be conducted in
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the siting optimization process. Although this responsibility belongs to OWF
developer, the maritime authorities can’t just walk away, both parties should play a
crucial part in the risk assessment. It is suggested that the use of NRA models should
be harmonised, the transparency should be improved and more representative
stakeholders should be involved. Generally, the data-based quantitative risk
assessment approach is preferable to the qualitative risk assessment approach in view
of objectivity and accuracy. Regarding the minimum safety distance from OWF to
shipping route, anchorage, etc., there shouldn’t be a fixed distance suitable for all
circumstances. On the contrary, the minimum safety distance at the design phase of
an OWF should be determined on a case by case basis, taking into account the
differentiated traffic conditions such as volume, tonnage, cargo, sea conditions, etc.
All in all, the siting of OWF requires the critical input from the maritime authorities
both in institutional and technical levels. The maritime authorities should optimize
the sites on the basis of traffic conditions and navigation resources, to eliminate or
mitigate the negative impacts of OWFs to navigation environment from the origin.

4.2 RCOs in the construction phase of OWF
The construction of an OWF usually takes up more than one year, during which
period the working environment is harsh due to the hostile natural environment such
as bad weather and rough sea, not to mention the complex traffic flow. Besides, the
offshore construction makes it hard for maritime safety supervision. In order to
ensure the safety of navigation during the construction phase, the following RCOs
are recommended.
On one hand, it is recommended to establish a special regulation applicable to OWF
maritime safety supervision in order to maintain the traffic order during the
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construction phase, and protect safety of navigation, property, lives and marine
environment. The regulation should be an overarching framework consisting a wide
range of matters including management requirement on construction vessels, crew
members and temporary staff, the issuance of marine license, the use of guardship,
contingency planning and emergency response, etc. In particular, the supervision
over the seaworthiness of construction vessels and the competency of crew members
should be strengthened due to frequent operations against relevant regulations such
as the use of substandard vessel, insufficient manning level, improper lookout and
violation of collision avoidance rules, etc. A feasible supervision program can be
initiated based on the construction plan to effectively conduct supervision over the
operations that pose major threat to navigation environment. A guardship can be
deployed to safeguard the construction water and prevent passing vessels from
entering the water accidentally. The maritime safety information (MSI) should be
made available to the construction vessels for implementing safety measures, and the
reporting system should be established to be informed of the dynamic conditions of
the construction vessels.
On the other hand, it is suggested to establish the marine Aids to Navigation for
OWF rigorously. During the construction phase, the marking of construction site is
absolutely necessary. Generally speaking, there is no doubt about using the Special
Marks as AtoNs in the construction phase of an OWF, however inconsistency arises
as to the use of different light characteristics. Special marks as is shown in figure 4.1
and Table 4.1 are used to indicate a special area or feature whose nature may be
apparent from reference to a chart or other nautical publication. They are not
generally intended to mark channels or obstructions where MBS6 provides suitable

MBS is an abbreviation for IALA Maritime Buoyage System, which is an internationally recognised buoyage
system and has been adopted by lighthouse authorities from more than 50 countries. It aims to harmonise the
AtoN markings of all coastal countries since its inception in the 1970s.
6
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alternatives. A majority of the special marks were fitted with Morse “O” lighting
rhythm, as the construction sites were considered as marine operation areas. Some
were fitted with Morse “C” lighting rhythm, as the construction sites were considered
as established offshore structures. And a few were fitted with Morse “P” lighting
rhythm to indicate that the construction sites were prohibited from entering. A variety
of lighting rhythms are presented in figure 4.2. But, in order to avoid ambiguity, the
markings of OWFs in the construction phase should be harmonised. In this regard,
the Morse “O” lighting rhythm is recommended based on the following
considerations. First of all, viewing the construction site as prohibited area is not
reasonable in that the OSVs constantly shuttle between port and the site, which
perhaps brings misunderstanding to other passing vessels. Then, the Morse “C”
lighting rhythm fitted on established offshore structures, obviously an OWF in the
construction phase is not completed yet. Last but not least, only the Morse “O”
lighting rhythm marking the area of operation provides explicit caution without
ambiguity.

Figure 4.1

Special marks

Source: From “R1001 the IALA Maritime Buoyage System”, by IALA, 2017, p.21.
https://www.iala-aism.org/product/r1001-iala-maritime-buoyage-system/
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Table 4.1

Description of Special Marks
Description
Colour

Yellow

Shape of buoy

Optional, but not conflicting with Lateral marks.

Top-mark (if any)

Single yellow “X” Shape

Light
(when fitted)

Colour

Yellow
Any, other than those reserved for cardinal, isolated
danger and safe water marks.
The use of pictograms is authorised, as defined by a
competent authority.

Rhythm

Pictogram

Source: adapted from “R1001 the IALA Maritime Buoyage System”, by IALA, 2017, p.21.
https://www.iala-aism.org/product/r1001-iala-maritime-buoyage-system/

Table 4.2

Usage of different light rhythms for special marks

Category

Sign
Colour

Anchorage

Black

Prohibited area

Black

Marine
operation area

Red and
White

Traffic
Separation

Black

Offshore
structure

Black

Recreational
area

Red and
White

Aquatic area

Black

Crossing area

Black and
White

Light Characteristics

Pictogram

Colour

Rhythm

Period “s”

M “Q”
- -·-

Yellow

M “P”
·- -·
M “O”
- - M “K”
-·M “C”
-·-·
M “Y”
-·- M “F”
··-·
M “Z”
- -··

12 s

Remarks: 15 s can be an alternative
Source: From “Maritime Buoyage System, China”, by Ministry of Transport, 2016, p.8.
http://jtst.mot.gov.cn/search/std?q=
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4.3 RCOs in the operating phase of OWF
An OWF after completion of construction usually will be operating for more than 20
years. The OWF will exert long-term and permanent influence on safety of
navigation, which requires effective and sufficient RCOs from the maritime
authorities. The establishment of AtoN is an essential probability reducing RCO.
However, the AtoNs established so far in China during the operating phase of OWFs
are lack of uniformity as illustrated in the chapter 2. SOLAS Chapter V Regulation
13.2 states that, “In order to obtain the greatest possible uniformity in aids to
navigation, Contracting Governments undertake to take into account the international
recommendations and guidelines when establishing such aids”. Hence, it is suggested
that IALA Recommendations R0139 on the Marking of Man-Made Offshore
Structure should be followed. In fact, the outdated GB 17380-1998 had been revised
in the past few years achieving great uniformity with R0139, which will come into
force by the end of 2021. Generally speaking, the Significant Peripheral Structure
(SPS)7 of an OWF shall display Morse “C” Yellow, with a nominal range of 5 NM.
The Intermediate Peripheral Structure (IPS)8 of an OWF shall be marked with Morse
“C” Yellow, the lighting rhythm shall be distinctly different from those displayed on
the SPS, with a nominal range of 2 NM. See figure 4.2 for better comprehension how
an OWF should be marked. The Substation or Meteorological Mast, if considered to
be a composite part of the OWF, shall be included as part of the overall OWF
marking, otherwise it shall be marked as an isolated offshore structure, which is
Morse “U” White ≤15s with a nominal range of 10 NM.

7
8

A Significant Peripheral Structure is the ‘corner’ or other significant point on the periphery of the OWF.
An Intermediate Peripheral Structure is Intermediate structures on the periphery of an OWF other than the SPS.
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Figure 4.2

Sample marking of an OWF

Source: From “R0139 The Marking of Man-Made Offshore Structures”, by IALA, 2013, p.14.
https://www.iala-aism.org/product/marking-of-man-made-offshore-structures-o-139/

Apart from the proper markings of OWF, this subsection will illustrate the existing
RCOs in the Binhai OWF, and then put forward additional RCOs based on the risk
assessment result obtained in chapter 3.
4.3.1 The existing RCOs in the operating phase of Binhai OWF
In terms of maritime safety supervision, the RCOs in this phase resemble that of
construction phase, inter alia, seaworthiness of operation and maintenance vessels,
competency of crew members, reporting system, promulgation of MSI, traffic control
and SAR. In particular, the OSVs used for transporting OWF maintenance personnel
are given much attention due to some safety concerns such as replacing the
maintenance vessel with substandard fishing boat, unqualified crew members,
insufficient manning, overloading, etc. Moreover, “routeing scheme” can be also
applied to the OSVs considering their relatively fixed routes, which is also beneficial
for emergency SAR operation.
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In terms of AtoN service, fixed marks have been established on the platforms of the
wind turbines in accordance with IALA R0139. First, colouring and numbering of
wind turbines. The structures were painted yellow all around from the level of HAT
up to 15 metres. The structures were numbered black with the height no less than 1
metre. Second, fixed light beacons. The Binhai OWF generally contains two blocks
(H1 & H2), consisting a total of 125 wind turbines as delineated in Figure 4.3. The
Binhai H1 OWF have been marked with six light beacons, among which four light
beacons were fitted on ＃1, ＃5,＃21 and ＃25 wind turbines that were viewed as
significant peripheral structures, and two light beacons were fitted on ＃11 and ＃
15 wind turbines that were viewed as intermediate peripheral structures. All the six
light beacons display Morse “C” Yellow 12 s with synchronised flashing. The Binhai
H2 OWF have been marked with thirteen light beacons, all of which were viewed as
significant peripheral structures because all the wind turbines in the second block
were distributed in such a way that they formed a polygon. The thirteen light beacons
display Morse “C” Yellow 12 s with synchronised flashing. Third, AIS AtoN. In
order to enhance the identification of the OWF under poor visibility, four wind
turbines in Binhai H1 OWF and five wind turbines in Binhai H2 OWF were also
installed with AIS AtoNs providing comprehensive navigation service. Detailed
technical data are given in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4.
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Figure 4.3

Site plan of Binhai OWF

Source: Adapted from “Aids to Navigation Project Design of Binhai OWF”.

Table 4.3 AtoNs Technical data of Binhai H1 OWF in the operating phase
NO.
1
2
3
4
5
6

Name
Binhai H1 light
beacon
Binhai H2 light
beacon
Binhai H3 light
beacon
Binhai H4 light
beacon
Binhai H5 light
beacon
Binhai H6 light
beacon

7

Binhai H1

8

Binhai H2

9

Binhai H4

10

Binhai H5

Character

Special
Marks

AIS

Coordinates (CGCS-2000)
N
E
34°24′36.07″

120°09′33.63″

34°25′38.89″

120°10′53.68″

34°24′42.57″

120°12′23.27″

34°23′47.10″

120°13′48.53″

34°22′44.31″

120°12′28.47″

34°23′39.77″

120°11′03.21″

34°24′36.07″

120°09′33.63″

34°25′38.89″

120°10′53.68″

34°23′47.10″

120°13′48.53″

34°22′44.31″

120°12′28.47″

Light
characteristics

M “C” Y 12 s
Synchronised
flashing

Source: Adapted from “Aids to Navigation Project Design of Binhai H1 OWF”.
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Location
＃1 wind
turbine
＃5 wind
turbine
＃15 wind
turbine
＃25 wind
turbine
＃21 wind
turbine
＃11 wind
turbine
＃1 wind
turbine
＃5 wind
turbine
＃25 wind
turbine
＃21 wind
turbine

Table 4.4 AtoNs Technical data of Binhai H2 OWF in the operating phase
NO.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Name
Binhai H7
light beacon
Binhai H8
light beacon
Binhai H9
light beacon
Binhai H10
light beacon
Binhai H11
light beacon
Binhai H12
light beacon
Binhai H13
light beacon
Binhai H14
light beacon
Binhai H15
light beacon
Binhai H16
light beacon
Binhai H17
light beacon
Binhai H18
light beacon
Binhai H19
light beacon

Character

Special
Marks

Coordinates (CGCS-2000)
N

E

34°32′19.6″

120°19′32.8″

34°32′19.0″

120°23′03.6″

34°32′01.1″

120°24′56.6″

34°31′27.5″

120°28′27.6″

34°30′36.5″

120°27′33.6″

34°28′59.7″

120°25′01.5″

34°28′07.0″

120°23′38.8″

34°27′11.5″

120°22′11.7″

34°27′11.8″

120°20′36.2″

34°28′07.9″

120°18′50.8″

34°29′01.0″

120°17′10.8″

34°30′38.6″

120°15′07.6″

34°31′29.7″

120°17′00.0″

14

Binhai H7

34°32′19.6″

120°19′32.8″

15

Binhai H8

34°32′19.0″

120°23′03.6″

16

Binhai H10

34°31′27.5″

120°28′27.6″

17

Binhai H14

34°27′11.5″

120°22′11.7″

18

Binhai H18

34°30′38.6″

120°15′07.6″

AIS

Light
characteristics

M “C” Y 12 s
Synchronised
flashing

Location
＃1 wind
turbine
＃9 wind
turbine
＃13 wind
turbine
＃37 wind
turbine
＃66 wind
turbine
＃84 wind
turbine
＃95 wind
turbine
＃100 wind
turbine
＃96 wind
turbine
＃85 wind
turbine
＃67 wind
turbine
＃38 wind
turbine
＃14 wind
turbine
＃1 wind
turbine
＃9 wind
turbine
＃37 wind
turbine
＃100 wind
turbine
＃38 wind
turbine

Source: Adapted from “Aids to Navigation Project Design of Binhai H2 OWF”.

4.3.2 Additional RCOs for Binhai OWF
As indicated in chapter 3, there were many cargo vessels navigating in close vicinity
of the OWF, and a lot of fishing vessels were navigating inside of the OWF. This

59

force of habit of navigation not only endangers the vessels themselves but also poses
a threat to the OWF. In order to reduce the risk of collision, the following RCOs are
recommended.
First, establish Safety Zone, Safe Passing Distance and Recommended Route.
Pursuant to UNCLOS Article 60, a Safety Zone of 500 metres in breadth could be
established for protection of wind turbines, all ships including fishing vessels must
respect and implement the Safety Zone with generally accepted international and
domestic regulations regarding navigation in the vicinity of wind turbines and Safety
Zone. Based on the simple and practical calculation model produced by PIANC, the
Safe Passing Distance between wind turbines and shipping route can be calculated.
Considering that the ships are navigating between the two blocks of Binhai OWF,
meaning that wind turbines are situated on both sides of ships, therefore the
calculation model “Starboard side of any route: 0.3 NM + 6 ship lengths + 500 m”
should be applied. As is learned from the navigational risk assessment result in
chapter 3, the maximum length of ship navigating in the vicinity of Binhai OWF is
270 m, taking the future maximization trend of ships and depth of water into account,
the length of 300 m is taken in this case. Eventually, the proposed Safe Passing
Distance = 0.3 NM + 6 × 300 m + 500 m ≈ 1.5 NM. The local maritime authority
should publicise this information as soon as it is adopted through identification on
the nautical charts and publications and promulgation of MSI. Based on the “General
Planning of National Coastal Shipping Routes” , Jiangsu MSA announced the
“Shipping Route Planning of Jiangsu Coastal Waters” in 2012. The shipping route
between Guanhe and Binhai port is as follows: A ship after passing clear of the safe
water mark of Guanhe kou should alter its course to 145 ° , and proceed to the
position (34°21′12″N / 120°20′23″E), and then turn to 180°, and proceed to the
position (34°17′15″N / 120°20′23″E), arriving at the entrance light buoy of Binhai
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Port. Vice versa for the shipping route from Binhai Port to Guanhe kou. The voyage
planning shows that the shipping route passes the H1 & H2 OWF in between. It is
suggested to develop a Recommended Route based on this shipping route that could
facilitate safety of navigation in the vicinity of Binhai OWF. The proposed
Recommended Route starts with the position (34°30′11.30″N / 120°10′12″E), and
ends with the position (34°21′12″N / 120°20′23″E), with the depth of water 12
metres approximately. In view of the navigational risk assessment result, the number
of vessels using the route is around 556 ships per year. Based on an AIS study by
Maritime Institute Netherlands (MARIN), a traffic lane which accommodates 556
ships per year with a maximum size of 300 metres should be at least 1200 metres
wide (=2 × 2 × 300 m). Considering the sufficient width of navigable waters, the
width of the Recommended Route is expanded to 2 NM. The Safety Zone and
Recommended Route are indicated in Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4 The Safety Zone and Recommended Route of Binhai OWF
Source: Produced by the author.
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Second, the marking of Recommended Route and adjustment of light characteristics
of light beacons. The proposed Recommended Route can also be marked with Safe
Water Marks to indicate navigable waters of the waterway and separate the two-way
traffic flow. Six safe water marks can be installed in the centreline of the
Recommended Route as delineated in Figure 4.4. The technical data of the six safe
water marks can be found in Table 4.5. As mentioned above, the lighting rhythm of
light beacons on IPS shall be distinctly different from those displayed on the SPS,
nevertheless the four light beacons fitted on SPS and two light beacons fitted on IPS
display identical lighting rhythm. For easy identification of the OWF, it’s suggested
to adjust the lighting rhythm of the two light beacons fitted on IPS from 12 s to 15 s,
and the nominal range from 5 NM to 2 NM.
Table 4.5 The technical data of the six safe water marks
Character

Coordinates (CGCS-2000)
N
E

NO.

Name

1

S1 light buoy

34°30′11.30″

120°10′12.00″

2
3
4
5

S2 light buoy
S3 light buoy
S4 light buoy
S5 light buoy

34°28′23.40″
34°26′35.50″
34°24′47.54″
34°22′59.48″

120°12′14.28″
120°14′16.60″
120°16′18.92″
120°18′21.07″

6

S6 light buoy

34°21′12.00″

120°20′23.00″

Safe Water
Marks

Light characteristics
Colour
Rhythm

White

Isophase,
occulting,
one long
flash every
10 s or Morse
“A”

Source: Produced by the author.

Third, eliminate the blind spots of maritime safety supervision by establishing
complementary AIS, VHF, Radar and CCTV equipment. Affected by the operating
distance of shore-based AIS stations and the signal interference of OWF, the loss of
AIS signal and intermittent loss of communication occur frequently in ships
navigating inside and in the vicinity of the OWF. According to GMDSS, Sea Area A1
is defined as “An area within the radiotelephone coverage of at least one VHF coast
station in which continuous DSC alerting is available”. A1 covers a sea area up to
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about 25 NM from the coast station in China. The nearest coast station is situated in
Lian Yungang covering an area with the center coordinates ‘34°44′ N, 119°21′ N’ and
a radius of 25 NM as delineated in Figure 4.5. Obviously, the Binhai OWF is beyond
the coverage of Lian Yungang coast station. Shore-based Radar is an essential facility
in provision of vessel traffic services. The Binhai OWF is also beyond the reach of
Binhai port VTS as shown in Figure 4.6. CCTV system has been used by the
maritime authorities in major ports and waterways, enabling visual surveillance of
traffic flow. In view of the demand analysis, it’s suggested to install AIS base station,
VHF base station, Radar and CCTV equipment on the platform of substation
(uninterrupted power supply, maintenance friendly) to enhance the AIS, VHF, Radar
and video signal coverage around the OWF. Figure 4.7 shows the approximate signal
coverage of the proposed AIS and VHF base stations. All data can be fed into VTS
center of the local maritime authority so as to improve the identification accuracy of
ships, enhance VTS public service and realize continuous supervision and
management of both static and dynamic information of ships.

Figure 4.5

Signal coverage of Lian Yungang coast station

Source: Produced by the author.
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Figure 4.6 VTS area of Binhai Port
Source:

From “Vessel Traffic Services Guide, Yancheng MSA”.

Figure 4.7

Signal coverage of AIS and VHF base stations

Source: Produced by the author.

Furthermore, an Electronic Fencing System integrating AIS, Radar, VHF, CCTV and
acousto-optic alarm devices can be also established on the substation. It could
effectively capture, warn, call and expel all errant vessels, ensuring safety of
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navigation around Binhai OWF. The AIS, Radar and CCTV devices are used for
capturing static and dynamic information of ships navigating around the OWF. And
VHF and acousto-optic alarm devices can be used for warning of ships entering the
warning areas of the OWF. Main components of the electronic fencing system are
listed in Table 4.6. Three levels of warning areas can be set up on the periphery of the
OWF at a distance of 500 m, 1000 m and 1500 m respectively. The three level early
warning mechanism of Binhai OWF is shown in Figure 4.8. Should a ship cross the
level 1 warning line, Radar and AIS would capture its information, and a warning
message would be broadcast through VHF radiotelephone notifying the ship to keep
clear. Should the ship proceed to cross the level 2 warning line, the early warning
system would be activated automatically warning the ship to keep away. If the ship
were to defy and cross the level 3 warning line, CCTV would be initiated monitoring
the dynamics of the ship in real time, and VTS involvement would be needed at this
time to expel the ship and collect the evidence in case of any accident incurred.
Table 4.6
NO.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Main components of the electronic fencing system
Components
No.1 acousto-optic
alarm device
No.2 acousto-optic
alarm device
No.3 acousto-optic
alarm device
No.4 acousto-optic
alarm device
No.5 acousto-optic
alarm device
No.6 acousto-optic
alarm device
No.7 acousto-optic
alarm device
No.8 acousto-optic
alarm device
No.9 acousto-optic

Coordinates (CGCS-2000)
N
E
Acousto-optic alarm device
34°24′36.07″

120°09′33.63″

34°25′38.89″

120°10′53.68″

34°24′42.57″

120°12′23.27″

34°23′47.10″

120°13′48.53″

34°22′44.31″

120°12′28.47″

34°23′39.77″

120°11′03.21″

34°32′19.60″

120°19′32.80″

34°32′19.00″

120°23′03.60″

34°32′01.10″

120°24′56.60″
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Location
＃1 wind
turbine
＃5 wind
turbine
＃15 wind
turbine
＃25 wind
turbine
＃21 wind
turbine
＃11 wind
turbine
＃1 wind
turbine
＃9 wind
turbine
＃13 wind

H1
OWF

H2
OWF

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

alarm device
No.10 acousto-optic
alarm device
No.11 acousto-optic
alarm device
No.12 acousto-optic
alarm device
No.13 acousto-optic
alarm device
No.14 acousto-optic
alarm device
No.15 acousto-optic
alarm device
No.16 acousto-optic
alarm device
No.17 acousto-optic
alarm device
No.18 acousto-optic
alarm device
No.19 acousto-optic
alarm device

34°31′27.50″

120°28′27.60″

34°30′36.50″

120°27′33.60″

34°28′59.70″

120°25′01.50″

34°28′07.00″

120°23′38.80″

34°27′11.50″

120°22′11.70″

34°27′11.80″

120°20′36.20″

34°28′07.90″

120°18′50.80″

34°29′01.00″

120°17′10.80″

34°30′38.60″

120°15′07.60″

34°31′29.70″

120°17′00.00″

turbine
＃37 wind
turbine
＃66 wind
turbine
＃84 wind
turbine
＃95 wind
turbine
＃100 wind
turbine
＃96 wind
turbine
＃85 wind
turbine
＃67 wind
turbine
＃38 wind
turbine
＃14 wind
turbine

AIS base station
20

AIS base station

34°29′32.4″

120°20′16.00″

Substation

120°20′16.00″

Substation

Radar
21

Radar

34°29′32.4″

VHF base station
22

VHF base station

34°29′32.4″

120°20′16.00″

Substation

CCTV
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
Source:

No.1 camera
with pan-tilt system
No.2 camera
with pan-tilt system
No.3 camera
with pan-tilt system
No.4 camera
with pan-tilt system
No.5 camera
with pan-tilt system
No.6 camera
with pan-tilt system
No.7 camera
with pan-tilt system

34°25′38.89″

120°10′53.68″

34°24′42.57″

120°12′23.27″

34°23′47.10″

120°13′48.53″

34°27′11.80″

120°20′36.20″

34°28′07.90″

120°18′50.80″

34°29′01.00″

120°17′10.80″

34°30′38.60″

120°15′07.60″

Produced by the author.
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＃5 wind
turbine
＃15 wind
turbine
＃25 wind
turbine
＃96 wind
turbine
＃85 wind
turbine
＃67 wind
turbine
＃38 wind
turbine

H1
OWF

H2
OWF

Figure 4.8 The three level early warning mechanism of Binhai OWF
Source:

Reproduced from “Safety Assurance Method of Offshore Wind Farm Based on Electronic

Fencing

and

Acousto-optic

Early

Warning

System”,

by

SUN

et

al.

2020,

P.62.

http://doi:10.13646/j.cnki.42-1395/u.2020.05.024.

4.4 RCOs in the decommissioning phase of OWF
The actual decommissioning of most OWFs in China is at present a decade away,
and there are no fixed set of rules and procedures available so far. In order to make
sure that the decommissioning of an OWF will be conducted in due time, a
decommissioning fund should be set aside in advance, and a planning of
decommissioning should be drawn up as early as possible.
As depicted in chapter 2, the decommissioning phase is simply the reverse procedure
of the construction phase. In this regard, most of the RCOs in the construction phase
are conceivably applicable to the decommissioning phase. First, the maritime
authorities have to check and issue the marine license for permitting the
decommissioning operation in the designated site. Second, a specialized maritime
regulatory framework should be developed and implemented by the maritime
authorities, including seaworthiness of working vessels, competency of crew
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members, dissemination of MSI, deployment of guardship, traffic control,
contingency planning and emergency response, and most importantly the dismantling
requirements of substructures and marine cables. The key factor to be considered
removing substructures and cables is whether it’s to be removed entirely or if any
parts are to be left behind. In cases where there are no environmental and economic
concerns, the complete removal can be implemented. Nonetheless in a majority of
cases the concerns over the safety, environmental and economic aspects co-exist,
which therefore should be handled on a case by case basis. The substructures could
be cut bellow seabed level where safety of navigation is guaranteed and the costs
reduced. They could be cut bellow the LAT level where the marine wild-lives are
preserved, but additional safety measures have to be established such as the marking
of the marine habitats and establishment of prohibited area to enhance safety of
navigation and habitats. The marine cables could be left in situ avoiding major
disruptions to marine environment, or they could be recovered from the seabed if no
disruptions induced. Ultimately the decisions are left for the national maritime
authorities to make taking into account the safety, environmental and economic
factors. In all cases, any remaining parts of substructures and marine cables must not
endanger safety of navigation. Third, the establishment of Special Marks (light buoys
displaying Morse “O” Yellow light characteristic) in accordance with GB 4696-2016
for marking the marine operation boundary is necessary. Last but not least, after
completion of decommissioning of the OWF, the nautical charts and publications
should be duly corrected and the AtoNs not in use should be removed.
Additionally, the navigation environment in this phase will probably evolve along
with the development of shipping industry, offshore wind industry, fishery industry,
etc. Therefore, a NRA prior to the actual decommissioning of an OWF should be
carried out in order to prescribe pragmatic safety mitigating measures that are
commensurate to the degree of risk.
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Chapter 5

Conclusions and Prospects

5.1 Research outputs
Although the first commercial OWF of China was established in 2010, lagging
behind twenty years compared with European countries, the offshore wind industry
has been developing very fast for the past decade. The rapid development of OWFs
is accompanied with negative impacts on navigation environment in different phases
of an OWF, among which three outstanding risk factors have been identified and
analysed.
(1) The siting of OWF. The national energy and oceanic authorities had jointly
established relevant rules regulating the development and construction process of
OWFs, nonetheless unfeasible siting of OWFs still occurred in some cases. The
immediate cause can be summarized as an irreconcilable conflict of the use of marine
spaces between safety of navigation of ships and OWFs. The root cause and hidden
reason however is the lack of voice and early participation of the maritime
authorities.
(2) The minimum safety distance. Generally three kinds of minimum safety distance
calculation models had been presented from different perspectives of vessel drift
induced collision, collision probability, collision avoidance regulations and
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electromagnetic radiation.
(3) The marking of OWF. In accordance with international and national provisions,
the OWFs shall be properly marked to enhance safe and expeditious navigation of
ships. However, judging from the statistics of the markings of some representative
OWFs in China, different marking techniques had been utilized due to the
application of different national and international regulations on the marking of
offshore structures including GB 4696-2016, GB 17380-1998 and IALA R0139. The
inconsistency in the adoption of marking regulations may impair the effectiveness of
AtoNs and confuse the mariners.
Navigational risk assessment has been widely used in the risk management of OWFs.
Plenty of NRA models have been developed so far, but the use of models by the eight
countries in question is quite diversified. OWF developers are responsible for
carrying out NRA in most countries except the Netherlands. All countries have
guidelines on NRA, but none of them require specific NRA model except German.
The diversification use of various NRA models needs to be addressed in that
different models used on the same area may obtain diverse outcomes. The NRA of
Binhai OWF has been successfully conducted using OpenCPN and the novel
mathematical model developed by the author. Based on the actual navigation
environment, risk analyses and practical NRA achievements of Binhai OWF, risk
control options have been proposed in different phases of OWF from the perspectives
of maritime safety supervision and navigation service.
(1) RCOs in the design phase of OWF. The maritime authorities should get actively
involved as early as possible in the siting of OWF to raise attention of the energy
authorities and the developers on maritime safety concerns. The MSP perhaps is a
desirable tool in harmonizing the use of marine spaces by different stakeholders, and
the maritime authorities should be involved by providing accessible maritime data.
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Moreover, the maritime authorities should develop specific OWF siting criteria
instead of vague and ambiguous wordings, and the diversification use of NRA
models should be harmonized to achieve relatively accurate result and remove the
bureaucratic burden.
(2) RCOs in the construction phase of OWF. A designated maritime safety
supervision regulation consisting a wide range of matters should be formulated to
enhance safety of navigation during the construction phase of OWF. The marking of
the construction area should be harmonized using Morse “O” lighting rhythm to
indicate the marine operation area of an OWF.
(3) RCOs in the operating phase of OWF. The marking of OWFs in the operating
phase should also be harmonized according to international and national recognized
regulations. Generally speaking, the OWFs comprised of an array of wind turbines
should be fitted with Morse “C” lighting rhythm, and the isolated structures such as
the meteorological mast or substation should be fitted with Morse “U” lighting
rhythm. Based on the existing RCOs of the Binhai OWF, additional RCOs have been
prescribed including establishment of Safety Zone, Safe Passing Distance and
Recommended Route, the marking of Recommended Route and adjustment of light
characteristics of light beacons, elimination of the blind spots of maritime safety
supervision and establishment of an Electronic Fencing System.
(4) RCOs in the decommissioning phase of OWF. Most of RCOs in the construction
phase of OWF are applicable to the decommissioning phase given that one is the
reverse process of the other. Nonetheless, the decommissioning process should be
somehow treated differently due to the uncertainties and complexity. A planning
procedure should be carried out as early as possible to minimise the uncertainties and
complexity. A decommissioning fund should also be arranged in advance to ensure
the scheduled decommissioning procedure. In order to facilitate safety of navigation,
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the maritime authorities should put forward the specific regulatory framework
concerning the dismantling requirements, etc. Additionally, A NRA procedure should
be implemented prior to the decommissioning operation to assess risks and come up
with risk mitigation measures accordingly.

5.2 Shortcomings and prospects
Comparatively speaking, the maritime safety supervision and navigation service for
OWFs are emerging new topics, at least in China. There are few existing mature
supervision and service practices for the time being. The risk mitigation measures for
each phase of an OWF that the author has proposed remain to be reviewed and
validated. Some measures perhaps will be proved to be insufficient and inadequate,
and should be further improved. Some measures may be considered as over-designed,
excessive and non cost-effective. The existing measures are not proportionate to the
degree of risk in that the maritime industry and offshore wind industry focusing on
the specialized knowledge in their respective fields aren’t aware of the necessity to
understand the technical details that their counterpart requires. Relying upon the
ocean, the maritime industry and offshore wind industry are becoming a community
of shared interests. Therefore, it’s highly necessary for both parties to learn from
each other as a start particularly with the advent of more intricate systems such as
maritime autonomous surface ships and floating wind turbines, and then work out
pragmatic risk control options as they see fit that are both sufficient and
cost-effective. Only by doing so can we enhance the cooperation on efficient use of
marine spaces and promote the harmonious co-existence between safety of
navigation and OWFs.
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